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Abstract—Designing robots capable of generating inter-
pretable behavior is a pre-requisite for achieving effective
human-robot collaboration. This means that the robots need
to be capable of generating behavior that aligns with human
expectations and, when required, provide explanations to the
humans in the loop. However, exhibiting such behavior in
arbitrary environments could be quite expensive for robots,
and in some cases, the robot may not even be able to exhibit
the expected behavior. Given structured environments (like
warehouses and restaurants), it may be possible to design
the environment so as to boost the interpretability of robot’s
behavior or to shape the human’s expectations of the robot’s
behavior. In this paper, we investigate the opportunities and
limitations of environment design as a tool to promote a type
of interpretable behavior – known in the literature as explicable
behavior. We formulate a novel environment design framework
that considers design over multiple tasks and over a time
horizon. In addition, we explore the longitudinal aspect of
explicable behavior and the trade-off that arises between the
cost of design and the cost of generating explicable behavior
over a time horizon.
I. INTRODUCTION
As more and more autonomous robots are deployed into
environments cohabited by humans, it becomes important
that the robots are capable of acting in a manner that is
interpretable to the humans in the loop. Inexplicable robot
behavior may not only lead to increased cognitive load on the
human but also lead to loss of trust in robot’s capabilities and
in the worst case, may lead to increased risk of danger around
the robot [1]. Roadmap for U.S. Robotics [2] emphasizes –
“humans must be able to read and recognize agent activities
in order to interpret the agent’s understanding”. In order
to be interpretable to the human, the robot should make
its behavior consistent with the human’s expectations of it.
However, the human’s expectation may deviate from reality
as the human may have incorrect mental models about the
robot’s beliefs and capabilities. In such cases, the robot
should be able to reason over the inconsistencies between
its own model and the human’s mental model to either
generate explicable behavior that is consistent with human’s
expectations of its behavior [3], [4], or, explain its behavior
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with respect to the inconsistencies in human’s mental model
[5], [6].
However, the environment in which the robot is operating
may not always be conducive to explicable behavior. This
may lead to inhibition of certain explicable behaviors or may
lead to prohibitively expensive explicable behaviors for the
robot. Fortunately, in highly structured settings, where the
robot is expected to solve repetitive tasks (like in warehouses,
factories, restaurants, etc.), it might be feasible to design the
environment in a way that improves explicability with respect
to multiple tasks. This brings us to the problem of environ-
ment design which involves designing the environment so as
to maximize (or minimize) some objective for the robot (for
example, optimal-cost to a goal, desired behavioral property)
[7]. While the problem of environment design for planning
problems has been investigated under the umbrella of goal
and plan recognition design [8], [9], they only form a subset
of interpretable behaviors studied in existing literature [10].
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore the
notion of environment design to maximize the explicability
of robot’s behavior.
However, environment design alone may not be a panacea
for explicability. For one, the design could be quite expen-
sive, not only in terms of making the required environment
changes but also in terms of limiting the capabilities of the
robot. Moreover, in many cases, there may not be a single set
of design modifications that will work for all the problems.
For instance, designing a robot with wheels for efficient
navigation on the floor will not optimize the robot’s motion
up a stairwell. This means, to achieve truly effective synergy
with autonomous robots in a shared space, we need a greater
synthesis of environment design and human-aware behavior
generation. This leads us to investigate a novel optimization
space, that requires trading off one-time (but potentially
expensive) design changes, against repetitive penalties borne
by the robot to achieve explicable behavior.
The main contributions of our paper are as follows:
1) We propose a new design framework that:
a) balances the cost of modifying the initial envi-
ronment with the cost of inexplicability of robot’s
behavior on the human,
b) optimizes this objective given a set of tasks over
a time horizon.
2) Our work is the first to model the longitudinal aspect
of explicable behavior which captures the human’s
tolerance to inexplicability (captured using discount
factor) as a result of repetitive execution of same tasks
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(a) Explicable behavior is costlier without design. (b) Optimal behavior is explicable with design.
Fig. 1: Use of environment design to improve the explicability of robot behaviors in shared environments.
over a time horizon.
3) In solving the objective, we leverage a classical plan-
ning compilation [11] to generate the most explicable
plan for a task in a given environment configuration
and explore its theoretical properties.
4) Through empirical evaluation and demonstration of
our approach in a simulated domain, we examine the
properties of our optimization criterion and the various
trade-offs that result from it.
A. Motivating Example
Consider a restaurant with a robot server (Figure 1a). Let
G1 and G2 represent the robot’s goals of serving the two
booths: it travels between the kitchen and the two booths.
The observers consist of human servers and customers at
the restaurant. The human servers serve the other two tables
in the restaurant. Given the position of the kitchen, the
observers may have expectations on the route taken by the
robot. However, unbeknownst to the observers, the robot can
not traverse between the two tables and therefore takes the
route around the tables. Therefore, the path marked in red is
the cheapest path for the robot but the observers expect the
robot to take the path marked in green in Figure 1a.
In this environment, there is no way for the robot to be
explicable. Applying environment design provides us with
alternatives. For example, the designer could choose to build
two barriers as shown in Figure 1b. With these barriers in
place, the humans would expect the robot to follow the path
highlighted in green. Now, the question of whether in this
case it is preferable to perform environment modifications
or to bear the impact of inexplicable behavior depends on
the cost of changing the environment versus the cost of
inexplicability caused by the behavior. In the rest of the
paper, we will explore the details of this trade-off.
II. BACKGROUND
We consider two agents: a robot and a human observer.
In this section, we introduce the notion of generating expli-
cable behavior and the problem of environment design, with
respect to these two agents.
A. Planning
In this paper, we will be focusing primarily on sequential
decision-making problem that can be modeled as a planning
problem [12]. A planning problem can be defined as a tuple
P = 〈F ,A, I,G, c〉, where F , is a set of fluents, A, is a
set of actions, and c is the cost for each action. A state s
of the world is an instantiation of all fluents in F . Let S
be the set of states. I ∈ S is the initial state, that is all
the fluents are instantiated. G is the goal where a subset of
fluents in F are instantiated. Each action a ∈ A is a tuple
of the form 〈pre(a), add(a), del(a)〉 where pre(a) ⊆ F is
a set of preconditions for the action a, add(a) ⊆ F is a set
of add effects and del(a) ⊆ F is a set of delete effects, i.e.,
ΓP(s, a) |= ⊥ if s 6|= pre(a); else ΓP(s, a) |= s ∪ add(a) \
del(a) where ΓP(·) is the transition function. The solution
to P is a plan or a sequence of actions pi = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉,
such that, ΓP(I, pi) |= G, i.e., starting from the initial state
sequentially executing the actions lands the robot in the goal.
The cost of the plan, c(pi), is a sum of the cost of all the
actions in it, c(pi) =
∑
ai∈pi c(ai).
B. Explicability
Let PR = 〈F ,AR, IR,GR, cR〉 be the robot’s model cap-
tured as a planning problem. The need for generating expli-
cable behavior arises because the robot’s planning model is
different from the human’s mental model of it. The difference
can be in terms of set of actions, initial state or goal of
the robot. Thus an explicable planning problem is defined as
PExp = 〈PR,PH , δPH 〉, where PH = 〈F ,AH , IH ,GH , cH〉
represents the human’s mental model of it, and δPH is
a distance function used by the human to compute the
explicability of a plan. We assume that the human’s mental
model is available. This is usually the case when any product
is deployed and developers capture a generic user model
which can be learned from prior interactions. In this work, we
only focus on the reasoning aspects once we have the model,
rather than focusing on the acquisition of such a model which
can be an input to our approach. Let Π∗PH represent the set
of expected plans with respect to PH . Here, Π∗PH captures
the notion of the humans preference on the plans feasible
in her mental model. A valid plan that solves PR can exist
anywhere on the spectrum of inexplicability from high to
low.
Definition 1: The inexplicability score, IE(·, ·, ·), of the
robot’s plan piR that solves PR is defined as follows for the
human’s mental model PH and a distance function δPH (·, ·):
IE(piR,PH , δPH ) = min
piH∈Π∗PH
δPH (piR, piH) (1)
where δPH (·, ·) is a distance function that assesses the
difference between the two plans.
The robot’s objective is to choose plans with minimal
inexplicability score in the human’s mental model. We will
use the notation Π∗IE(·,PH ,δPH ) to refer to the set of plans
in the robot’s model with the lowest inexplicability score,
and IEmin(PExp) to represent the lowest inexplicability
score associated with the set. Further, let fExp represent the
decision function used by the explicable robot, such that,
fExp(PExp) represents the cheapest plan that minimizes the
inexplicability score, i.e., fExp(PExp) ∈ Π∗IE(·,PH ,δPH ) and6 ∃pi′ : pi′ ∈ Π∗IE(·,PH ,δPH ) ∧cR(pi
′) < cR(fExp(PExp)).
C. Environment Design
An environment design problem [7] takes as input the
initial environment configuration along with a set of modifi-
cations and computes a subset of modifications that can be
applied to the initial environment to derive a new environ-
ment in which a desired objective is optimized.
Let P0R = 〈F0,A0R, I0R,G0R, c0R〉 denote the initial envi-
ronment in which the robot is operating, ρR be the set of
valid configurations of that environment, such that P0R ∈ ρR.
Let O be an arbitrary metric that needs to be optimized
with environment design, i.e a planning model with lower
value for O is preferred. A design problem (adapted from
[7]) is a tuple 〈P0R,∆,ΛR, C,O〉 where, ∆ is the set of all
modifications, ΛR : ρR × 2∆ → ρR is the model transition
function that specifies the resulting model after applying a
subset of modifications to the existing model, C : ∆ → R
is the cost function that maps each design choice to its cost.
That is, the modifications are independent of each other and
their costs are additive. We will overload the notation and
also use C as the cost function for a subset of modifications
(C(ξ) =
∑
ξi∈ξ C(ξ)).
The set of possible modifications may include modifica-
tions to the set of states, action preconditions, action effects,
action costs, initial state and goal. An optimal solution for
a design problem identifies a subset of design modifica-
tions, ξ, that minimizes the following objective function
consisting of the cost of modifications and the metric O:
minO(ΛR(P0R, ξ)), C(ξ).
III. DESIGN FOR EXPLICABILITY
In this framework, we not only discuss the problem of
environment design with respect to explicability but also in
the context of (1) a set of tasks that the robot has to perform
in the environment, and (2) over the lifetime of the tasks i.e.
the time horizon over which the robot is expected to repeat
the execution of the given set of tasks. These considerations
add an additional dimension to the environment design
problem since the design will have lasting effects on the
robot’s behavior. In the following, we will first introduce the
design problem for a single explicable planning problem,
then extend it to a set of explicable planning problems and
lastly extend it over a time horizon.
A. Single Explicable Problem
In the design problem for explicability, the inexplicability
score becomes the metric that we want to optimize for. That
is we want to find an environment design such that the
inexplicability score is reduced in the new environment. This
problem can be defined as follows:
Definition 2: The design problem for explicability is a
tuple, DPExp = 〈P0Exp,∆,ΛExp, C, IEmin〉, where:
• P0Exp ∈ ρExp is the initial configuration of the explica-
ble planning problem, where ρExp represent the set of
valid configurations for PExp.
• ∆ is the set of design modifications that are available
in the given set of valid configurations ρExp. The space
of all possible designs is given by the power-set 2∆.
• ΛExp : ρExp × 2∆ → ρExp is the transition function
over the explicable planning problem, which gives the
updated explicable planning problem after applying a
subset of designs.
• C is the additive cost associated with each design in ∆.
• IEmin : ρExp → R is the minimum possible inexpli-
cability score in configuration, i.e. inexplicability score
associated with the most explicable plan.
With respect to our motivating example in Figure 1a,
DPExp is the problem of designing the environment to
improve the robot’s explicability given its task of serving
every new customer at a booth (say G1) only once. The
optimal solution to DPExp involves finding a configuration
which minimizes the minimum inexplicability score. We also
need to take into account an additional optimization metric
which is the effect of design modifications on the robot’s
plan cost. That is, we need to examine to what extent the
decrease in inexplicability is coming at the robot’s expense.
For instance, if you confine the robot to a cage so that it
cannot move, its behavior becomes completely and trivially
explicable, but the cost of achieving its goals goes to infinity.
Definition 3: An optimal solution to DPExp, is a subset
of modifications ξ∗ that,
min IEmin( P∗Exp), C(ξ∗), cR(fExp(P∗Exp)) (2)
where P∗Exp = ΛExp(P0Exp, ξ∗) is the final modified ex-
plicable problem, IEmin(·) represents the minimum possi-
ble inexplicability score for a given configuration, C(ξ∗)
denotes the cost of the set of design modifications and
cR(fExp(P∗Exp)) is the cost of cheapest most explicable plan
in a configuration.
B. Multiple Explicable Problems
We will now show how DPExp evolves when there are
multiple explicable problems in the environment that the
robot needs to solve. When there are multiple explicable
tasks there may not exist a single set of design modifications
that may benefit all the tasks. In such cases, a solution might
involve performing design modifications that benefit some
subset of the tasks while allowing the robot to act explicably
with respect to the remaining set of tasks. Let there be k
explicable planning problems, given by the set PExp =
{〈PR(0),PH(0), δPH(0)〉, . . . , 〈PR(k),PR(k), δPH(k)〉},
with a categorical probability distribution D over the
problems. We use PExp(i) ∈ PExp to denote the ith
explicable planning problem. These k explicable problems
Fig. 2: Illustration of longitudinal impact on explicability.
Prob determines the probability associated with executing
each task in PExp. For each task, the reward is determined
by the inexplicability score of that task. The probability of
achieving this reward is determined by γ × probability of
executing that task. Additionally, with a probability (1 −
γ) the human ignores the inexplicability of a task and the
associated reward is given by an inexplicability score of 0.
may differ in terms of their initial state and goal conditions.
Now the design problem can be defined as:
DPExp,D = 〈P0Exp,D,∆,ΛExp, C, IEmin,D〉, (3)
where P0Exp, is the set of planning tasks in the initial
environment configuration, IEmin,D is a function that com-
putes the minimum possible inexplicability score in a given
environment configuration by taking expectation over the
minimum inexplicability score for each explicable planning
problem, i.e., IEmin,D(PExp) = E[IEmin(PExp)|PExp ∼
D]. With respect to our running example, DPExp,D is the
problem of designing the environment given the robot’s task
of serving every new customer only once at either of the
booths (G1, G2) with probability given by distribution D.
The solution to DPExp,D has to take into account the
distribution over the set of explicable planning problems.
Therefore the optimal solution is given by:
min ( IEmin,D( P∗Exp), C(ξ∗), (4)
E[cR(fExp(P∗Exp)) | P∗Exp ∼ D] )
That is, a valid configuration that minimizes the minimum
possible inexplicability score which involves expectation
over minimum inexplicability scores for each explicable
planning problem, cost of the design modifications (these
modifications are equally applied to each explicable plan-
ning problem) and the expectation over the cheapest most
explicable plan for each explicable planning problem.
C. Longitudinal Impact on Explicable Problems
The process of applying permanent (or semi-permanent)
design modifications to an environment makes more sense if
the tasks are going to be performed repeatedly in the presence
of a human observer. This has quite a different temporal
characteristic in comparison to that of execution of one-time
explicable behavior in an environment. For instance, design
changes are associated with a one-time cost (i.e. the cost of
applying those changes in the environment). On the other
hand, if we are relying on the robot to execute explicable
plans at the cost of foregoing optimal plans, then it needs
to bear this cost multiple times in the presence of a human
observer over the time horizon.
We will use a discrete time formulation where the design
problem is associated with a time horizon T . At each time
step, one of the k explicable planning problems is chosen.
Now the design problem can be defined as:
DPExp,D,T = 〈P0Exp,D,∆,ΛExp, C, IEmin,D, T 〉 (5)
In our running example, DPExp,D,T is the problem of
designing the environment given the robot’s task of serving
the same customer at either of the booths with a distribution
D over a horizon T .
In the past literature, the explicability of a robot’s behavior
has been studied with respect to a single interaction with
a human over a given task [3], [4]. However, we consider
a time horizon, T > 1, over which the robot’s interaction
with the human may be repeated multiple times for the
same task. This means the human’s expectations about the
task could evolve over time. This may not be a problem
if the robot’s behavior aligns perfectly with the human’s
expectations. Although, if the robot’s plan for a given task
is associated with a non-zero inexplicability score, then the
human is likely to be more surprised the very first time
they notice the inexplicable behavior than they would be if
they noticed the inexplicable behavior the subsequent times.
Since, the second time the robot performs the same task, the
human may get used to the inexplicability of the robot’s
behavior and may expect the robot to perform the same
inexplicable behavior. As the human watches the task being
performed over and over, the amount of surprise associated
with the inexplicable behavior starts decreasing. In fact, there
is a probability that the human may ignore the inexplicability
of the robot’s behavior after sufficient repetitions of the task.
We incorporate this intuition by using discounting.
Figure 2 illustrates the Markov reward process to represent
the dynamics of this system. Let (1 − γ) denote the prob-
ability that the human will ignore the inexplicability of the
robot’s plan, i.e, the reward will have inexplicability score
0. γ times the probability of executing a task represents
the probability that the reward will have the minimum
inexplicability score associated with that task. Assuming
γ < 1, the minimum possible inexplicability score for a set
of explicable planning problems is:
fT (IEmin,D(PExp)) = IEmin,D(PExp)
+ γ ∗ IEmin,D(PExp) + . . .+
γT−1 ∗ IEmin,D(PExp)
fT (IEmin,D(PExp)) = 1− γ
T
1− γ ∗ IEmin,D(PExp) (6)
Thus the optimal solution to DPExp,D,T is given by:
min ( fT (IEmin,D( P∗Exp)), C(ξ∗), (7)
E[cR(fExp(P∗Exp)) | P∗Exp ∼ D] ∗ T ).
That is, the optimal solution is a valid configuration that
minimizes the minimum possible inexplicability over the set
of explicable planning problems given the tolerance of a
human observer to inexplicable behavior, one-time cost of the
design modifications and the expectation over the cheapest
most explicable plan for each explicable planning problem
given a time horizon. Note that, since the design cost is not
discounted and we always make the design changes before
the problem is selected in an episode, there is never a reason
to delay the design execution to future steps in the horizon.
Instead it can be executed before the first time step.
IV. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
We now discuss a solution strategy for our design problem
when a cost-based distance function (δcPH ) is used by the
human to determine the inexplicability of a plan. Given
a plan pi, such that, ΓPR(IR, pi) |= GR, the distance
from an expected plan pi′ in the human model is given as
δcPH (pi, pi
′) =
{
exp(|cH(pi)− cH(pi′)|), if ΓPH (IH , pi) |= GH
∞, otherwise (8)
Here, we will use the set of plans that are optimal in
the human’s mental model as the expected plan set. This
means that for calculating Equation 1, we do not require an
additional minimization over the space of expected plans as
every plan in the robot’s model should be equidistant from
every optimal plan in the human’s mental model (and the
distance is infinity if the current robot plan is not executable
in the human’s mental model). For brevity, we refer to any
plan with infinite inexplicable score as being invalid for a
problem in PExp. Also, we assume that the actions in both
the models have unit costs. That is, cH(pi) = cR(pi) = |pi|.
Proposition 1: ∀i ∈ 1, . . . , k, pi, pi′ ∈ Π∗IE(·,PH(i),δPH (i)),
cR(pi) = cR(pi
′).
The above proposition states that all plans in
Π∗IE(·,PH(i),δPH (i))
have equal costs in PR(i) due to
the assumption of unit costs. Therefore, while calculating
the value for the objective function of DPExp,D,T , we
can choose an arbitrary plan from Π∗IE(·,PH(i),δPH (i))
to
calculate the term corresponding to the robot’s cost.
A. Search for Optimal Design
To find the optimal solution for DPExp,D,T , we will
perform a breadth-first search over the space of environ-
ment configurations that are achievable from the the initial
configuration through the application of the given set of
modifications [13]. The performance of the search depends
on the number of designs available. By choosing appropriate
design strategies, significant scale up can be attained. Each
search node is a valid environment configuration and the
possible actions are the applicable designs. For simplicity,
we convert the multi-objective optimization in equation 2
into a single objective that is a linear combination. In the
new objective each term is associated with a coefficient, say,
α, β and κ, respectively. The value of each node is decided
by the aforementioned objective function. For each node, it
is straightforward to calculate the design modification cost.
However, in order to calculate the minimum inexplicability
score and the robot’s plan cost, we have to generate a plan
that minimizes the inexplicability score for each explicable
planning problem in that environment configuration. To
achieve this, we compile the problem of generating the expli-
cable plan to a classical planning problem. We will discuss
this compilation in the following subsection. Essentially, our
search has two loops: the outer loop which explores all
valid environment configurations, and the inner loop which
performs search in a valid environment configuration to find
a plan that minimizes the inexplicability score. At the end
of the search, the node with best value is chosen, and the
corresponding set of design modifications, ξ∗, is output.
B. Compilation for Most Explicable Plan
We show that generating the most explicable plan for a
PExp = 〈PR,PH , δPH 〉 is the same as generating an optimal
plan, pi∗mod, for a transformed planning problem Pmod. To
this end, we leverage the compilation used by [11] and
present a simplified version.
Definition 4: Given an explicable planning problem,
PExp = 〈PR,PH , δPH 〉, the transformed planning problem
is Pmod = 〈Fmod,Amod, Imod,Gmod, cmod〉, where,
• Fmod = FR ∪ FH
• For each amod ∈ Amod, amod = 〈pre(amod),
add(amod), del(amod)〉, where,
pre(amod) = {fR|f ∈ pre(aR)}∪{fH |f ∈ pre(aH)},
add(amod) = {fR|f ∈ add(aR)} ∪ {fH |f ∈
add(aH)},
del(amod) = {fR|f ∈ del(aR)} ∪ {fH |f ∈ del(aH)}
• Imod = {fR|f ∈ IR} ∪ {fH |f ∈ IH}, and
Gmod = {fR|f ∈ GR} ∪ {fH |f ∈ GH}
• For each amod ∈ Amod, cmod(amod) = cH(aH) = 1
We label the fluents with different subscripts to denote that
we maintain two separate copies of fluents in the transformed
planning problem: i.e., for every f ∈ F , there is robot’s
fluent, fR ∈ FR and the human’s belief about it, fH ∈
FH . We assume there is a one to one mapping between the
actions in the robot’s model and those in the human’s mental
model, so there are two versions of each action. The action
transformation ensures that an action is executable by the
robot if and only if its preconditions are satisfied in both the
robot’s model and the human’s model, and that it produces
effects consistent with both models.
Proposition 2: The Pmod produces a plan that solves
PExp, so that following properties hold:
• Soundness A plan pimod that solves Pmod is a valid
solution for PExp.
• Completeness For every valid plan that solves PExp,
there is a corresponding valid plan that solves Pmod.
• Optimality A plan pi∗mod that solves Pmod optimally is
the most explicable plan for PExp.
Proof: The transformed planning problem has the union
of the constraints imposed by both PR and PH . Given a
plan pi, such that, ΓPmod(Imod, pi) |= Gmod, by the definition
of the compilation, we also have ΓPR(IR, pi) |= GR and
ΓPH (IH , pi) |= GH . Hence, a plan pimod that solves Pmod is
a valid plan for PExp.
From the definition of the inexplicability score for a
plan piR which is a valid solution to PExp, we know that
ΓPH (IH , piR) |= GH . Such a plan piR solves both PR and
PH . Hence, piR will satisfy, ΓPmod(Imod, piR) |= Gmod.
Therefore, for every valid plan that solves PExp, there exists
a corresponding plan that solves Pmod.
Given PExp, let pi′ be the most explicable robot plan (or
equivalently plan with lowest inexplicable score) such that,
it is not an optimal plan for Pmod. By the definition of
explicability, this means pi′ must be valid plan for both PR
and PH . Further, by the completeness property, we know
that pi′ must be a valid plan for Pmod. This means for a plan
pi∗mod optimal in Pmod, we have cH(pi∗mod) < cH(pi′) (since
Pmod uses cH ). Hence, |cH(pi∗mod)− c∗H | < |cH(pi′)− c∗H |,
where c∗H is the cost of an optimal plan in PH (and we
know c∗H ≤ cH(pi∗mod) and c∗H ≤ cH(pi′)), which means
IE(pi∗mod,PH , δPH ) < IE(pi′,PH , δPH ). This contradicts
the original assertion, hence proving that there is a one to
one correspondence between optimal plans for Pmod and
Π∗IE(·,PH ,δPH ).
V. EVALUATION
We will now demonstrate for our running example how the
explicability value and design cost of the optimal solution
evolve when optimizing for a single explicable problem,
multiple explicable problems and multiple problems with a
design horizon. We will also evaluate the performance of
our approach on three IPC (International Planning Compe-
tition) domains and then discuss how the interplay between
explicability and plan cost occurs.
A. Demonstration
We use the restaurant domain from our running example
Figure 1a to demonstrate how the design problem evolves.
We constructed a domain where the robot had 3 actions: pick-
up and put-down to serve the items on the tray and move
to navigate between the kitchen and the booths. In the grid,
some cells are blocked due to the tables and the robot cannot
pass through these: cell(0, 1) and cell(1, 1). Therefore, the
following passages are blocked: cell(0, 0)-cell(0, 1), cell(0,
1)-cell(0, 2), cell(0, 1)-cell(1, 1), cell(1, 0)-cell(1, 1), cell(1,
1)-cell(1, 2), cell(1, 1)-cell(2, 1). We considered 6 designs,
each consisting of putting a barrier at one of the 6 passages
to indicate the inaccessibility to the human (i.e. the design
space has 26 possibilities).
For the following parameters: α = 1, β = 30, κ = 0.25
and γ = 0.9, we ran our algorithm for three settings: (a)
single explicable problem for T = 1, (b) multiple explicable
problems for T = 1, and (c) multiple explicable problems
for T = 10. As mentioned before, (a) involved serving a new
customer at a booth (say G1) only once, (b) involved serving
a new customer only once at either of the booths with equal
probability and (c) involved serving each customer at most 10
times at either of the booths with equal probability. We found
that for setting (a) and (b) there was no design chosen. This
is because these settings are over a single time step and the
cost of installing design modifications in the environment is
higher than the amount of inexplicability caused by the robot
(β > α). On the other hand, for setting (c), the algorithm
generated the design in Figure 1b, which makes the robot’s
roundabout path completely explicable to the customers.
B. Domain setup
We used three IPC domains for evaluation:
Blocksworld, IPC-Grid and Driverlog. For
each domain, we created two versions: the robot’s domain
and the human’s domain. We generated 20 design problems
for each domain, and each had 3 planning problems with
uniform probability distribution. We used Fast Downward
with A* search and the lmcut heuristic [14] to solve the
compiled planning problems. The variable parameters in
our implementation are α, β, κ (coefficients associated with
the terms in the objective function), γ (discount factor) and
T (time horizon). For all the domains we used actions and
design modifications of unit cost.
For Blocksworld, the robot’s domain was the original
IPC domain, and the human’s domain assumed that the
robot can pick up multiple blocks simultaneously. The set of
allowed designs ensured that stacking for every block was
preceded by picking the block up from the table. This would
reduce the inexplicability for the human as the only block
that would be stacked is the one that was picked up from the
table before stacking. In practice, this may involve notifying
the human about the new rule. For IPC-Grid, the robot’s
domain was the original IPC domain and the human’s domain
assumed that diagonal movements were possible in the
grid. We allowed design modifications that pruned diagonal
actions. In actuality, this may involve notifying the human
that diagonal actions are not possible at certain locations.
For Driverlog, the robot’s domain was the original IPC
domain and the human’s domain assumed that packages can
be loaded and unloaded from anywhere regardless of the
location of the driver. We allowed modifications that required
load and unload actions to occur only after a disembark
action. This may again involve notifying the human about
the new rules concerning load/unload actions.
C. Performance on IPC domains
For this objective, we set the parameters α, β and κ to 1.0,
0.25, 0.25 respectively for all domains i.e., we gave more
weight to minimizing inexplicability. We set T to 1 and 10
and γ to 0.9. We allowed the meta-search to run for at most
30 minutes per problem. If it ended within 30 minutes we
output the optimal design modification, else we output the
design modification which gave the best optimization value
(or total cost) among the explored nodes. To show the impact
of design modifications, we computed the inexplicability
score, plan cost, total cost for most explicable plan in
the initial model (i.e. without any design modification). To
compare the impact of longitudinality, we compute these
parameters for single step horizon and multi-step horizon.
Domain Horizon Metrics Design
Inexplicability Plan Cost Total Cost
Time Taken (secs)
Size w/o Design w Design % Difference w/o Design w Design % Difference w/o Design w Design % Difference
Blocksworld
1
Avg 1.25 14.11 2.18 -84.54 8.69 9.52 9.58 16.28 4.87 -70.07
1800
SD 0.79 16.86 0.92 - 1.39 1.85 - 17.11 1.38 -
10
Avg 1.25 91.90 14.20 -84.54 8.69 9.52 9.57 113.63 38.33 -66.27
SD 0.78 109.80 5.98 - 1.39 1.85 - 112.36 9.59 -
IPC-Grid
1
Avg 0.75 3571.84 1455.39 -59.25 24.84 24.84 0 23326.29 1461.79 -93.73
1800
SD 0.44 12043.62 4428.98 - 3.01 3.01 - 78444.61 4429.19 -
10
Avg 0.75 23264.19 9479.32 -59.25 24.84 24.84 0 23326.29 9541.61 -59.09
SD 0.44 78442.72 28846.93 - 3.01 3.01 - 78444.61 28848.86 -
Driverlog
1
Avg 0.8 2.26 1.6 - 29.14 8.46 9.17 8.46 4.37 4.09 - 6.39
219.42
SD 0.77 0.54 0.57 - 0.59 0.89 - 0.61 0.54 -
10
Avg 1.2 14.70 8.93 -39.28 8.45 9.71 14.76 35.85 33.50 - 6.57
SD 0.69 3.54 2.78 - 0.59 0.97 - 4.30 3.94 -
TABLE I: We report the impact of design modifications on inexplicability score, plan cost and total cost. We also report the
average and standard deviation values for the three optimization terms in the objective function along with the run time.
In Table I, we report the results for the 3 domains. By
comparing the inexplicability score with and without design,
we see that the inexplicability always decreases as expected.
For Blocksworld and IPC-Grid, the percentage decrease is
the same for one-step and multi-step horizon, this is because
same set of designs were the best found solutions for both
settings (under the time-limit) and the values got multiplied
with the value of T . On the other hand, for Driverlog,
there were different designs selected, as is evident from the
values. By comparing the plan cost with and without design,
we can see that for Blocksworld and Driverlog, there
is substantial increase in the plan cost. This is because for
these two domains, the designs ensured an action could
be performed only after execution of another action. In
this case, the robot bears additional cost for improving the
explicability. On the other hand for IPC-Grid, the action
pruning strategy removed actions from the human’s mental
model and therefore there is no increase in the plan cost.
Similarly, by comparing the total cost with and without
design, we can see that there is a significant decrease in
the total cost after applying design modifications. This is
because the optimization chooses design modifications that
minimize the overall cost associated with the initial model.
D. Interplay between inexplicability score and plan cost
To study the interplay between inexplicability score and
plan cost, we experimented with a DPExp,D,T problem in
the Driverlog domain. We used discount factor γ = 0.9
and design cost coefficient β = 0.25. We tested the impact
of different inexplicability score coefficient values (α: 0.5,
0.66, 0.75, 1) on number of design choices in an optimal
solution given different time horizons T : 1, 10, 20, 30, 40,
50. At most two design choices were allowed in the solution.
In Figure 3, we report the impact on the size of design
modifications. Recall that, the discount factor γ denotes
the probability with which the human will not ignore the
inexplicability of the behavior. Therefore, when γ is set to
0.9, the optimization prioritizes reduction in inexplicability
score. Given that design cost coefficient β = 0.25 is low,
Fig. 3: The plot shows the influence of inexplicability score
coefficient (α) on design size chosen in a optimal solution
over different time horizons for a Driverlog problem.
even with single time step horizon T = 1, designs are
found that improve the explicability of the robot’s behavior
as shown in Figure 3. However, the designs in Driverlog
domain lead to increase in the cost of the robot plan (due
to additional disembark actions). Given a long time horizon
(T = 50), the cost overhead borne by the robot for being
explicable becomes greater than the impact of inexplicability
score on the human. Hence no designs are found at T = 50
for any of the α values. Although if explicability of robot’s
behavior is desired for longer horizons, this can be achieved
by setting α to a high value. This shows the inherent interplay
between the inexplicability of the behavior and the additional
plan cost borne by the robot to reduce inexplicability.
VI. RELATED WORK
This work explores the connection between two parallel
threads of current research: one on environment design and
the other on explicable behavior. The problem of environ-
ment design is connected to that of mechanism design [15],
which has been thoroughly investigated by the game theory
community. Environment design [7] involves modifying the
environment so as to maximize or minimize some objective
for the robot [16]. The problem of design has been leveraged
to simplify related problems like goal recognition [8], plan
recognition [9] etc. These works have studied the possibility
of modifying the environment so as to make the robot’s be-
havior easily recognizable. These works have also looked at
various types of designs, including, action pruning [8], action
conditioning [13], sensor refinement [13], sensor placement
[17], etc. The problem of environment design has also been
studied for stochastic actions [18], [19].
The notion of explicability was introduced in [3], which
discussed generating explicable behavior by learning the
sequence of actions that are explicable to the humans. [4]
explored the notion of explicability given knowledge of the
human’s mental model, and used plan distances as a stand in
for the human’s distance function. Generation of explicable
behavior has also been studied in combination with expla-
nations [20]. Further, [11] explores the use of explanatory
actions to convert the explanation generation problem to a
sequential decision making problem. A recent work [10],
has also explored the connections between explicability and
other types of interpretable behavior like legibility [21], [22],
predictability [21], [23].
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we bridge the gap between past works on
environment design and those on generation of explicable
behavior. We present a novel framework of environment
design for explicability. The notion of environment design
makes sense when there is repeated execution of tasks or
when there are multiple tasks in the environment. This allows
us to explore a novel trade-off that arises between one-time
cost of design and the repeated cost overhead incurred by
the robot for generating explicable behavior. In prior works
on explicable plan generation, the underlying assumption has
been that there is a one-time interaction between a human and
a robot, and that the robot’s inexplicable behavior may lead to
increased cognitive load on the human or loss of trust in the
robot. In this work, we relaxed this assumption and explored
the notion of inexplicability given repeated interactions with
a single human over a distribution of tasks.
In this work, we assumed that the robot is capable of per-
forming explicable behavior. However, we can also consider
the problem of environment design for explicability when
the robot is rational but not cooperative (i.e. it will only
generate cost-optimal plans in the given environment and
not bear the overhead cost of being explicable). In this case,
the emphasis is on choosing a set of design modifications
which reduce the worst case inexplicability score associated
with cost-optimal plans for a task. Similarly, we can also
consider the problem of environment design for explicability
when the robot is a rational robot but can communicate
(i.e. it will only generate cost-optimal plans in the given
environment but it will provide an explanation to make its
behavior explicable). In this case, we again see similar trade-
offs between cost of one-time environment design versus
the cost of repeated explanations borne by the robot over a
time horizon. This would require modeling the influence of
longitudinal interactions on explanations which stems from
the fact that the human will update their mental model when
they receive an explanation.
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